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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
MIKE CORY BARBER,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20060663-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
First, this Court should reverse because there is a reasonable probability that but
for private counsel's failure to adequately investigate the availability of expert testimony
to counter the State's expert testimony, the jury would have acquitted. Second, this Court
should reverse because the trial court's decision to deny private counscPs motion to
withdraw and/or to continue violated Barber's right to counsel of choice and resulted in
ineffective assistance of counsel. Third, this Court should reach Barber's rule 403 claim
because it is preserved and, as explained in Barber's opening brief, this Court should
reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the exhibits even though
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed their limited probative value.
ARGUMENT
I.

BUT FOR PRIVATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY
INVESTIGATE THE AVAILABILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
TO SUPPORT BARBER'S DEFENSE, THERE IS A REASONABLE
PROBABILITY THAT THE JURY WOULD HAVE ACQUITTED

In its brief, the State does not address the first prong of the Strickland test—

whether '"counsel's performance was deficient.'" !See Aplc. Br. at 22. As explained in
Barber's opening brief, private counsel acted deficiently when he failed to hire an expert
to counter the State's expert testimony that Dominick's injuries were inconsistent with
the accidental falls described by Barber. See Aplt. Br. at Part LA.
Private counsel knew that the medical records and expert testimony interpreting
the medical records were critical to the State's case and to Barber's defense. Regardless,
he failed to examine "ca large stack" of medical files; failed to investigate whether expert
testimony existed; failed to review the file sufficiently to realize that LDA had already
found an expert; and failed to review the rules sufficiently to realize that they allowed
Barber to receive funding to hire an expert. R. 530:4-8; see Aplt. Br. at Parts I.A, II.
As in State v. Hales, therefore, private counsel was "'not in a position to make a
reasonable strategic choice' as to whether to rely solely on" character testimony rather
than seeking expert testimony '"because the investigation supporting [his| choice was
unreasonable.'" State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^[83, 152 P.3d 321; sec Aplt. Br. at Part LA;
Houskceperv. State, 2008 UT 78,ffl|39-40,—- P.3d — (holding juvenile received
deficient performance at retention hearing where the State presented w"at least four
medical experts who testified as to the aggravated nature of the act'" and defense cittorney
did not call any experts to testify "'on the issue of whether the act was completed in an
aggressive and violent manner, to help the juvenile court make a decision whether the
case should be retained in juvenile court'").
Regarding Strickland's second prong, this Court should hold, as our supreme court
held in Hales, that private counsel's failure to investigate prejudiced Barber's case. See
2

Aplt. Br. at 28-37. This result is further supported by Houskeeper, issued on November
7, 2008. In Houskeeper, as in Hales, the defense attorney prejudiced his client's case by
failing to '"make a reasonable investigation into the availability of prospective [expert]
witnesses.'" Houskeeper, 2008 UT 78 at <|R[38, 41.
In Houskeeper, our supreme court held that juvenile received deficient
performance at the retention hearing in his case because his attorney failed to call an
expert to testify about '"whether the act was completed in an aggressive and violent
manner/" Houskeeper. 2008 UT 78 at ^|39-40. Our supreme court then concluded that
the attorney's failure to "'make a reasonable investigation into the availability of
prospective witnesses" prejudiced his client. IcL at ^[38, 41. "The defense witnesses
called at [juvenile's] criminal trial included medical experts." IcL at <|(44. One expert
"testified that she could not 'say with any absolute certainty' whether the injuries [victim)
suffered resulted from consensual or nonconsensual contact," but that her injuries were
"'consistent with' injuries incurred from first-time consensual sex." Id. Another expert
testified "that the pain medication j victim] took on the night of the sexual encounter
could create cintoxicat[ing] effects' and would 'reduce the level of pain sensation' she
felt." Id. "Together, these experts' testimony specifically addressed the 11 retention
factor regarding the level of violence and/or aggression that occurred during the sexual
encounter/* kk at ^|45. "Because they based their testimony at the criminal trial on the
same photographs and reports that were available at the retention hearing, they easily
could have testified in that hearing as well." Id. Although our supreme court could not
"discern the exact effect that any missing testimony would have had on the outcome of
3

(juvenile's I retention hearing," it determined that "the absence of that testimony at the
retention hearing affected the entire evidentiary picture." Id at ^ 4 3 , 46. Our supreme
court, therefore, held that "there [was] a reasonable probability that if these witnesses had
testified at the retention hearing, the outcome would have been different." Id. at lj[46.
To reverse, this Court need not conclude that Dr. Rothfcdcr's testimony
"unequivocally repudiated the State expert's testimony on every critical point." Aplc. Br.
at 27 (citation omitted). It also need not conclude "that the jury would have more likely
than not believed" Dr. Rothfcdcr's testimony over the State's expert testimony. Hales,
2007 UT 14 at ^|92. Rather, this Court should reverse if it concludes "that there was a
'reasonable probability' that, but for the errors, |Barber] would not have been convicted."
Hales, 2007 UT 14 at «|J92; see liouskeeper. 2008 UT 78 at 1|42. "A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine [this Court's) confidence in the
outcome." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 1|92.
As in Hales, private counsel's failure to investigate ""had a pervasive effect on the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture/" Hales,
2007 UT 14 at *|[86 (citation omitted). Like the experts in liouskeeper, Dr. Rothfeder did
not definitively rule out abuse as the cause of Dominick's injuries. Compare
liouskeeper, 2008 UT 78 at ^[44 with R. 530:9-36. But the absence of his testimony at
trial still "affected the entire evidentiary picture." liouskeeper, 2008 UT 78 at l]|46.
Dr. Rothfeder testified at the rule 23B hearing that the head injury and the
fractures could have resulted from the falls that Barber described. See R. 530: 9-36. He
also testified that the bruising was not necessarily caused by abuse and could be
4

explained by the accidental falls and/or by Anastasia, that surprise fractures are not
necessarily indicative of abuse, and that it is possible Dominick did not complain about
the less severe fractures after the February 28 fall because he was in so much pain from
the more serious fracture in the left forearm. Sex R. 530: 9-36.
This testimony directly contradicted the State's expert testimony and, if believed,
was "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to |Barber's | guilt." 1 laics. 2007 171 14 at
^|92. In particular, it would have provided "a competing interpretation" of Dominick's
injuries "that would have required | the jury] to weigh" the State experts' "interpretation
against the interpretation provided by another qualified expert." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at
^91; sec Aplt. Br. at 28-37. It would have "undermined the State's ability to use" expert
testimony "to conclusively pin responsibility for [Dominick's] injuries on [Barber]."
Hales, 2007 UT 14 at 1|91; sec Aplt. Br. at 28-37. And it "would have likely cast doubt
on the State's ability to rule out theories that the injury may have been accidental."
Hales, 2007 UT 14 al 1|91; sec Aplt. Br. at 28-37.
The evidence listed by the State as "non-medical evidence supporting defendant's
guilt." Aple. Br. at 26-27. is circumstantial. Sec Black*s Law Dictionary 595 (8th cd.
2004) (defining circumstantial evidence as "|cjvidcnce based on inference and not on
personal knowledge or observation"). In Utah, "'a conviction can be based on sufficient
circumstantial evidence.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). But
the circumstantial evidence in this case was not sufficiently "compelling" to overcome
the prejudice caused by private counsers deficient performance. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d
483, 487 (Utah 1984) (holding prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial where evidence
5

against defendant was not "compelling" and "jtjhe jury could have found either way").
r

lo the contrary, depending on whether the jury found the Stale's experts or the

defense expert more persuasive, the jury could have found that the circumstantial
evidence supported guilt, as the State claims, or innocence. Sec In re K.K.IL, 610 P.2d
849, 852 (Utah 1980) ("It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the weight of the
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and the facts to be found therefrom."); cf. State
v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) (reversing burglary conviction
for insufficient evidence where State relied on circumstantial evidence and "'evidence
supported|" defense that the burglary was committed "without [defendant's) assistance,
encouragement or knowledge"); State v. John. 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978) (holding,
in circumstantial evidence case, that "if there is any reasonable view of the credible
evidence which is reconcilable with the defendant's innocence, it would naturally follow
that there would be a reasonable doubt as to his guilt"); State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349,
p 5 , 173 P.3d 170 (holding that "'[wjhen the evidence in the record is circumstantial or
sufficiently conflicting, jurors arc more likely influenced by an improper argument'"),
cert, denied, 186 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008).
The State's proof at trial regarding the two counts was largely identical. There
were no eyewitnesses who could say that Dominick's injuries on February 28 (Count I)
or March 2 (Count II) were caused by abuse, rather than by accidental falls. R. 429: 43133. Thus, the State relied on expert testimony to prove that the injuries could not be
explained by accidental falls. R. 431-33. The major difference between Counts I and II
was that even without a proper defense investigation, there was expert testimony
6

available to support Barber's claim that the February 28 injuries resulted from an
accidental fall. R. 432:276-77. Private counsel elicited testimony during crossexamination that the doctors who examined Dominick after the February 28 incident
believed his injuries could be explained by an accidental fall on the Fireplace. R.
432:276-77. There was no similar expert testimony to solicit on cross-examination
regarding the March 2 incident, however, because the experts who treated Dominick for
those injuries where the same experts who testified for the State at trial. R. 431-32.
From the verdict, it appears that this difference affected the jury's deliberations.
R. 338; 433:487. Despite the circumstantial evidence, the jury accepted the expert
conclusion that an accidental fall could explain the February 28 injuries and acquitted on
Count I. R. 338; 433:487. If private counsel had presented expert testimony to show an
accidental fall could also explain Dominick's March 2 injuries, there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have again interpreted the circumstantial evidence
innocently and acquitted on Count Il|.
This is especially true given that the circumstantial evidence listed by the State
was weak and/or contradicted by other evidence. Sec Aple. Br. at 26-27. First,
emergency crew member Rohn Freeman thought Barber appeared "nervous, distracted,
and distant while the paramedics were treating Dominic." Aple. Br. at 26-27; see R.
431:183. But Barber's demeanor may have been his natural reaction to a terrifying
situation. Cf. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 0"|F|rom the
viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty
movement." (citations omitted)). Indeed, this is the conclusion that emergency crew
7

member Jacob Harmcr reached. R. 432:206. It appears that it was also the conclusion
that the jury reached regarding Count I. R. 338; 433:487. Following the February 28
incident, Barber exhibited similarly nervous, distracted, and distant behavior. R. 431:5556, 96, 100, 103-04. For example, he left Dominick alone in bed despite a swollen,
visibly broken arm, and he repeatedly left a distraught Jena V alone at the hospital so he
could "smoke" or "call his sister, his mother." R. 431:55-56, 96, 100. 103-04. By
acquitting Barber of Count I, it appears the jury interpreted this behavior innocently. R.
338; 433:487.
Likewise, Barber's failure to go to the hospital on March 2, as well as his
statements, changed appearance, and significant weight loss at his arrest a month later,
may have been his natural reaction to being wrongly accused of child abuse, especially if
he knew what jail was like and was afraid of going back. Aple. Br. at 26-27; R. 432:31517, 365. fcC|C|ili/cns will avoid contact with police for reasons other than fear of being
caught for a crime they have committed. A completely innocent person may wish to
avoid the delay which a discussion with police may entail; others have a fear of police
authority; still others resent and seek to avoid the 'hassle' of a stop which lacks any
basis." Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30.1)12, 177 P.3d 655 (citation omitted).
Second, Ilarmer, who was not a police officer trained to investigate potential
crime scenes, testified that there was water in the bathtub, but that it did not appear to
have been recently used. R. 432:204, 211, 214-15; see Aple. Br. at 26-27. Officer
Pearcc, however, contradicted this evidence. Officer Pcarcc testified that the bathtub
•'looked like it had recently been used'* because there was a "fresh residue" of water,
8

"some soap," and a "scrubber" in the tub; and there was "water just on the outside of the
tub, as if you were to step out of the tub." R. 432:287, 290, 299. Similarly, when the
paramedics arrived, Dominick was dry and partially dressed. See Aple. Br. at 26-27. But
Barber explained this evidence. During his interview with Officer Ilauer, Barber said
thai after Dominick fell, he got Dominick "out of the tub, 11 dried [DominickJ off and got
[Dominick] dressed" because he did not want Dominick "to be cold." R. 432:313-14,
362. This explanation was supported by a "bundle" of "very" wet towels found
downstairs, a "block of ice" found on the kitchen table, and "two or three rags" found by
the kitchen sink that appeared "to have blood" on them." R. 432:291-92, 302, 322, 363.
Finally, Anastasia said that she was locked in her bedroom at the time of the
incident and that Dominick "had been 'kind of not listening to my M i k e / " Aple. Br. at
26-27; SJX R. 431:94; 432:360-61. Both of these statements, however, were suspect.
Anastasia was four years old at the time of the incident. R. 431:46, 78. Officer Ilauer,
who interviewed Anastasia after the incident, said that "[s|hc was really hard to
interview" because he "wasn't getting a lot of coherent statements from her." R.
432:326. She "deviate) dj a lot from the line of questioning" and had "a hard time
focusing." R. 432:359; see R. 432:356-61. In fact, he could not understand some of her
statements at all because she used "kind of baby talk." R. 432:360.
Further, when Officer Ilauer arrived at the scene, he found Anastasia watching
television in her room with her bedroom door unlocked and open. R. 432:324. When he
interviewed her, she did not say anything about being locked in her room. R. 432:358.
To the contrary, when Officer Flaucr asked her if she saw what happened, Anastasia said
9

that Dominick "'was taking a bath/' "fell asleep,v and "wouldn't wake up." R. 432:35759. She also said that Barber tried to wake Dominick by "yell|ing|, 'Dominick!
Dominick! Dominick!'" but Dominick "wouldn't wake up." R. 432:357-59. It was Jena
V who heard Anastasia say she was locked in her room and Jena V testified that
Anastasia did not make this comment until "a month after" the incident. R. 431:94.
Therefore, this Court should reverse because there is a reasonable probability that
the jury would have acquitted Barber of Count II but for private counsel's deficient
performance. As explained above and in Barber's opening brief, the State's proof
regarding Counts I and II was largely identical. Private counsel was able to attack the
State's proof regarding Count I, however, by eliciting expert testimony though crossexamination that countered the State's expert testimony regarding the cause o[
Dominick's February 28 injuries. Thereafter, despite the circumstantial evidence, the
jury acquitted Barber of Count I. If private counsel had performed an adequate
investigation and located expert testimony to counter the State's expert testimony
regarding the cause of Dommick's March 2 injuries, there is a reasonable probability that
the jury would have acquitted Barber of Count II as well.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY PRIVATE
COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND/OR TO CONTINUE
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE IT VIOLATED
BARBER'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE AND RESULTED
IN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Because Barber hired a private attorney to represent him, he had the right to
counsel of choice. See Aplt. Br. at 43-45. When he became dissatisfied with his counsel
of choice, it was Barber's right to obtain different counsel. See id. Because he was also
10

indigent, R. 21-22; 25-26; 430:16, Barber had the right to choose to be represented by
LDA. See, e.g., Roosevelt City v. Curry, 2006 UT App 328, f8, 143 P.3d 309 ("The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . assures 'indigent defendants who arc charged with
crimes the fundamental right to have the assistance of counsel in order to ensure they
receive a fair trial." (citations omitted)).
The State has cited no cases that contradict this argument. See Aplc. Br. at 30
(citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 151 (2006); State v. Gall,
2007 UT App 85,1[13 & n.5, 158 P.3d 1105). In Gail, our supreme court noted: " c |T|hc
right to counsel of choice docs not extend to defendants who require counsel to be
appointed for them." Gall, 2007 UT App 85 at fjjl2 n.5 (quoting Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. at 151). This statement originated in Gonzalez-Lopez and was supported by
citations to Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), and Caplin & Drysdale v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151 (citing Wheat,
486 U.S. at 159; Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624). In these cases, the statement
referred not to the situation where the defendant retains private counsel and then chooses
to return to a public defender, as happened here, but to the situation where an indigent
defendant is represented by a public defender and asks the trial court to appoint a
different public defender or an attorney he cannot afford. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159
(holding that "defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford
or who for other reasons declines to represent the defendant"); Caplin & Drysdale, 491
U.S. at 626 (holding "Sixth Amendment's protection of one's right to retain counsel of
his choosing . . . does not go beyond The individual's right to spend his own money to
11

obtain the advice and assistance of. . . counsel""); sec also State v. Arguclles, 2003 UT 1,
f

iJ75, 63 P.3d 731 ("A defendant is cnot entitled to pick and choose* among court-

appointed counsel." (citation omitted)); State v. Wulffcnstcin, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah
1986) (holding defendant "does not have an immutable right under the sixth amendment
of the United States Constitution or under our state constitution to reject court-appointed
counsel for the purpose of forcing the court to appoint private counsel of his own choice
to represent him, absent a showing of good cause for such a change" (citations omitted)).
Thus, by denying private counsel's motion, the trial court denied Barber his right
to counsel of choice. It also denied Barber his right, as an indigent, to have adequate
counsel appointed to represent him. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(1) (2003) (wtA
determination of indigency or continuing indigency of any defendant may be made by the
court at any stage of the proceedings."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (2003) ("Each
county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in criminal cases. . .
."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302(1) (Supp. 2008) ("Legal counsel shall be assigned to
represent each indigent. . . ."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302(3) ('The court may make a
determination of indigency at any time."); State v. Arauellcs, 2003 UT 1, ^|74, 63 P.3d
731 (holding that wCC|a| defendant cannot be forced to proceed with incompetent counsel""
(citation omitted)); State v. Wulffcnstcin, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986) ("An accused is
entitled to employ counsel of his choice, and if indigent and unable to obtain his own
counsel, he is entitled to representation by a court-appointed attorney." (citation
omitted)); Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978) (same).
The State claims that this Court should affirm because private counsel "never
12

argued below that a denial of his motions would render him unprepared" or "that a
continuance was absolutely necessary in order for [him| to be prepared for trial." Aple.
Br. at 31-32 (citing State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 414 (Utah 1993)). In Cabututan,
however, our supreme court did not require an attorney to anticipate his own ineffective
assistance. Sec Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 414. To the contrary, it held: ''Denying a
continuance may result in the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." kh It then applied Strickland's ineffective assistance of counsel test to
determine whether denying the continuance violated the defendant's right to counsel. Id.
Specifically, in Cabututan, defendant argued "that the denial of the continuance
rendered his counsel ineffective because he had insufficient time to prepare a defense."
IdL at 414. Reviewing this argument under Strickland, our supreme court determined that
defendant raised "several instances of conduct by his attorney which fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." IdL It affirmed, however, because it found "no
violation of | defendant's) Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel"
since defendant failed "to show how these alleged deficiencies were prejudicial." Id.
Conversely, in this case, denying private counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel
and/or for a continuance resulted in a violation of Barber's right to effective assistance of
counsel. Sec Aplt. Br. at 21-45; supra at Part I. When it denied private counsel's motion,
the trial court knew that private counsel was in poor health and was unprepared for trial.
R. 150-51; 430:16, It also knew that private counsel would require more than the usual
amount of preparation because he did not practice criminal law regularly. R. 150-51;
430:16. Additionally, he had known private counsel "for some 30 years" and had low
13

expectations for private counsel's performance at trial even if he was prepared and in
good health. 11.530:65.
On top of this, the trial court knew that private counsel was most likely working
for free because Barber could not "sustain" private counsel's legal fees. R. 150-51;
430:16. "The legal assistance which an attorney renders to a client is his stock in trade;
and in order for the attorney to make a living, he must sell his service." Bedford v. Salt
Lake County, 447 P.2d 193. 195 (Utah 1968) (holding that "a statute requiring" a lawyer
to provide "'compulsory services to an indigent person . . . is unconstitutional as requiring
one to give services (a form of property) without just compensation being paid therefor").
Forcing an attorney to provide ''compulsory services to an indigent person" infringes on
an attorney's right to receive "just compensation" for his "services (a form of property)."
Id. The trial court knew, therefore, that private counsel's need to make a living might
generate a disincentive for private counsel to dedicate billable time to Barber's
unprofitable case and/or create a rift in the attorney-client relationship. Sec, e.g., In re
Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) (explaining that "|c"]ompclled legal service is
totally inconsistent with the giving of pro bono service" and that fc"|t|hc quality of the
uncompensated service can be expected to decrease in almost direct proportion to the loss
of choice of the professional rendering the service"); Wyoming Workers" Compensation
Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 854-55 (Wyo. 1991) (explaining that the quality of
representation decreases if "adequate compensation is not provided," for example, a "low
hourly fee may prompt an appointed lawyer to advi[s|c a client to plead guilty, although
the same lawyer would advise a paying client in a similar case to demand a jury trial").
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In other words, with less than one month to go before trial, the trial court denied
private counsel's motion despite knowing that private counsel was inexperienced, was
unprepared, and was likely to remain unprepared because he was in poor health and he
was not getting paid for his time. R. 150-51; 430:16; 530:65.
As demonstrated previously and in the opening brief, this decision

wC

rcsult[cd| in

the violation of [Barber's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Cabututan, 861 P.2d at
413; see Aplt. Br. at 21-45; supra at Part I. Private counsel recogni/cd the importance of
obtaining expert testimony to counter the State's expert testimony and support Barber
defense. R. 530:8. Regardless, he failed to investigate whether expert testimony existed
because he believed that Barber could not afford to pay expert fees: he failed to review
the rules sufficiently to realize that Barber was likely entitled to receive "public
assistance" to hire an expert witness; he failed to review the file sufficiently to realize
that LDA had already located Dr. Rothfeder, whose opinion countered the State's expert
testimony and supported the defense; and he failed to adequately review "a large stack"
of medical files, even though he knew that the medical records were critical to the State's
case and to Barber's defense. Sec Aplt. Br. at 21-45; supra at Part I.
Because the trial court's decision to deny private counsel's motion violated
Barber's right to counsel of choice and resulted in ineffective assistance, this Court
should hold that the trial court\s decision was an abuse of discretion.
III.

BARBER PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING
PHOTOGRAPHS IN VIOLATION OF RULE 403

The preservation rule exists because "the trial court ought to be given an
15

opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it/' and "a defendant
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing |
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, . . . claim] ing| on
appeal that the Court should reverse:' State v. Holgatc, 2000 UT 74, ^11, 10 P.3d 346
(quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original).
To preserve an issue for appeal a defendant need not present his entire appellate
argument to the trial court. Cfi State v. Valen/uela, 2001 UT App 332. ^[25 n. 4, 37 P.3d
260 (addressing identity issue even though not specifically preserved because defendant
preserved probable cause issue and identity included in probable cause issue); but see
Aple. Br. at 37-38. This is particularly true where the objection is "an extemporaneous
objection made in the heat of trial." State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985)
(recognizing that "an extemporaneous objection made in the heat of trial'' may require
less "specificity" than a "pretrial objection'* that "can be researched and written under
relatively calm circumstances" (citation omitted)).
Rather, a defendant properly preserves his issue for appeal if he "specifically
raise[sj the issue, such that it is brought 'to a "level of consciousness.'"" llolmstrom v.
C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, ^[26, 8 P.3d 281. Stated another way, an issue is
properly preserved if "'"it is submitted to the (rial court, and the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on the issue."'" Hart v. Salt Lake County ComrrTn, 945 P.2d 125,
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted)); sec State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 776
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection was timely because he "met the
requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial
16

court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)).
In this case, Barber properly preserved his rule 403 claim because he submitted it
to the trial court and obtained a ruling on it. Rule 403 says: "Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. . . ." Utah R. livid. 403. Below, the discussions regarding the challenged
photographs focused on the language of this rule. Sec R. 431:2-4, 65-66, 152-54. 158-59;
432:334. Following these discussions, the trial court, without exhibiting any confusion as
to the basis for Barber's objections, ruled that the challenged photographs were
admissible because any danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh their
probative value. See R. 431:2-4, 65-66, 152-54, 158-59; 432:334.
Prior to trial, private counsel "object[ed| to any evidence relative to bruising"
because it is "highly prejudicial to my client." R. 431:2. In response, the State stated that
"the standard is whether or not its probative value is substantially outweighed by any
unfair prejudice." R. 431:2. Applying this standard, it then argued that the evidence
related to bruising was "probative about whether or not this was an accident or whether
or not it was intentional injury" and was not unfairly prejudicial because the bruises were
"insignificant" compared to the other injuries. R. 431:3-4. After hearing both arguments,
the trial court agreed with the State and ruled that evidence related to the bruising was
admissible. 11.431:4.
During trial, private counsel objected to each photograph that Barber challenges
on appeal. R. 43 1-32. On the first day of trial, the State offered State's Hxhibits 10
through 15 and 26. R. 431:65. Private counsel immediately asked to approach the bench.
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R. 431:65. Although some of private counsel's statements during the subsequent sidebar
conference are inaudible, enough of the conversation is audible to reveal that private
counsel raised a rule 403 objection and the trial court ruled based on rule 403. R. 431:6566. In particular, private counsel said, "It's discretionary with the court but these are
quite gruesome pictures and I object on the grounds that they tend to inflame more than
inform." R. 431:65. In response, the trial court ruled, "Everybody's seen enough TV and
movies that these photographs don't (inaudible)." R. 431:66. Later, when the State
moved to admit State's Exhibits 15 through 22, private counsel renewed his previous
objections and the trial court overruled them based on the "|s|amc ruling" as before. R.
431:152-54, 158-59.
Finally, when the State moved to admit State's Exhibit 33 on the second day of
trial, private counsel again asked to approach. R. 432:333. As before, some of the
sidebar conference is inaudible. R. 432:334. Enough of the sidebar conference is
transcribed, however, to understand that both private counsel's objection and the trial
court's ruling were still based on rule 403. R. 432:334. Private counsel objected because
the photograph was "so inflammatory. I mean this is a gruesome photograph for anybody
and for the other reasons that I've stated that [just don't think bruising has anything to do
with the case in general." R. 432:334. Overruling the objection, the trial court reiterated
its previous holding and noted that "|a|s the case has gone on the bruising has become
more important." R. 432:334.
Thus, this Court should reach Barber's rule 403 claim because he properly
preserved it for appeal. Moreover, for the reasons articulated in Barber's opening brief,
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this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
exhibits even though their limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. Sec Aplt. Br. at 46-50.
CONCLUSION
Barber respectfully asks this Court to reverse his conviction.
SUBMITTED this \ \

day of December, 2008.

,r^L^A^O^Ov

LORI J. SliPPI
^ '
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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